Process error

Process error - Asylum support system failing on all fronts, says CAB

Executive summary

i. In April 2000, the Government established the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) to run a new, separate system for providing essential welfare support to asylum seekers, based on enforced dispersal to the regions and the provision of most subsistence support in the form of vouchers. NASS quickly established – and has retained – an unenviable reputation for administrative inefficiency and bureaucratic inaccessibility.

ii. Since April 2000, and especially since mid-2001, Citizens Advice Bureaux (CABx) in the asylum dispersal areas and elsewhere have dealt with increasing numbers of advice enquiries from NASS supported asylum seekers. Many of these individuals have required assistance contacting NASS to obtain vital extra support to enable them to attend obligatory Home Office asylum interviews or appeal hearings, or to purchase items not allowed for in the low level of subsistence support. Others have needed assistance to resolve problems with their NASS provided accommodation or, having been granted refugee status or other leave to remain, have been left in limbo between the NASS system and the mainstream welfare benefits system. Some have been left for days and sometimes weeks without the means to purchase food and other essential items.

iii. In many of these cases, administrative delay and inefficiency has been compounded by process error on the part of NASS. But in the vast majority of such cases, CABx are called on to provide not advice as such, but a ‘helping hand’ in breaking down the acute inaccessibility of NASS, which has no local counter services in the dispersal areas. This ‘helping hand’ usually involves telephone communication with NASS officials, and/or the submission of information to NASS by fax. In effect, CABx are providing services that should be provided by NASS itself.

iv. In October 2001, the Government announced the results of two internal reviews of the NASS system. The combined report of the two reviews acknowledged "real problems" with the system and made a number of specific recommendations for ensuring that in future NASS offers "a better service to asylum seekers and other stakeholders". These include the replacement of vouchers with "a more robust but less socially divisive scheme", possibly automated credit transfer; the piloting of asylum reception centres from late 2002; and a number of administrative reforms of NASS’ case management systems. The CAB Service welcomes many of these administrative reforms.

v. This report, based on evidence from the day-to-day, NASS related casework of CABx, concludes that the Government must go much further. In particular, it concludes that asylum seekers should be able to approach NASS directly at appropriately staffed ‘drop-in’ services in their dispersal area. Only then will NASS supported asylum seekers receive the "efficient, high quality" and responsive service that the Government has said should be expected of all public services.
vi. In our view, primary responsibility for dealing with basic service delivery problems should lie with NASS itself – just as, in the mainstream welfare benefits system, the Benefits Agency deals with basic casework problems through its local benefits offices. In general, the first port of call of a welfare benefits claimant with a problem relating to the delivery of his or her benefits is the local benefits office. Only where there is a misunderstanding or dispute over entitlement, or where the problem is less than straightforward, should such an individual need to access independent advice and assistance.

vii. The CAB Service believes that NASS supported asylum seekers who experience problems with the delivery of their NASS support should be able to approach NASS directly at dedicated counter services in their dispersal area. Clearly, such individuals may also need to access independent advice – including legal advice and representation – if the problem is complex or there is a dispute about entitlement. However, the experience of CABx, as described in this report, is that most NASS service delivery related problems are relatively straightforward. This would suggest that, given effective access to responsive, local NASS counter or ‘drop-in’ services, most such problems could be resolved by asylum seekers themselves, without outside intervention.

viii. The CAB Service warmly welcomes the Government’s increasing recognition that the service delivery of NASS needs to improve. We hope that this report will assist the Government in drawing up customer focused and stakeholder endorsed plans for reform of NASS.
1. Introduction

If you have not received this letter you should contact
NASS immediately on the number above.

1.1 On 3 April 2000, the Government established a new, separate system for providing welfare support to those seeking asylum in the UK whilst their application is under consideration. Under this system, those asylum seekers granted full support are dispersed to some 70 dispersal areas in the regions, and subsistence support is provided largely in the form of vouchers, with only a small cash element.

1.2 A new division within the Home Office, the National Asylum Support Service (NASS), was established to run this new support system. By October 2001, NASS was supporting some 52,700 asylum seekers and their dependants. However, many thousands more who applied for asylum prior to 3 April 2000 and whose claims have yet to be determined by the Home Office Immigration & Nationality Directorate (IND) remain supported by the mainstream welfare benefits system, or by a local authority, under ‘interim arrangements’ introduced by the Government in 1999. In time, many of these individuals will move to the NASS system, following the initial rejection of their asylum claim by IND and the lodging of an appeal.

1 Newly arrived asylum seekers are often vulnerable and needy, with many having fled appalling state brutality and oppression, armed conflict and/or the economic and social implosion of their own society. Many arrive in the UK with few if any financial resources, knowing no one and speaking no English. Some have urgent medical needs due to having been subjected to torture, rape, imprisonment or ill-treatment, or as the result of having witnessed the death or ‘disappearance’ of family members. And all have suffered the trauma of having lost both their home and their homeland.

1.1 One can only imagine, therefore, the confusion of such individuals on receiving a letter from NASS – the governmental body charged with meeting their welfare needs – that concludes with the statement at the head of this page. Yet, far from being a one-off error, this is the standard final sentence of thousands of letters sent to asylum seekers by NASS since April 2000. Sadly, it seems to encapsulate the approach of an organisation that has, within two years of its formation, established an unenviable reputation for administrative inefficiency and bureaucratic inaccessibility, both to those it exists to serve and to its stakeholders.

1 Not only does NASS take many times longer than its own performance target to determine applications for support, there are also significant backlogs in the processing of other vital matters – such as the making of six-monthly supplementary cash grants. And, in many cases, delay is compounded by process error and a surprising degree of bureaucratic insensitivity to the complex needs of individuals who are often fearful of authority and sometimes extremely vulnerable.

2 As a result, large numbers of NASS supported asylum seekers have been denied vital extra support to enable them to attend obligatory Home Office interviews or appeal hearings, or to purchase items not allowed for in their support allowance. NASS support is intended to be of short duration only and thus the level of subsistence support does not cover longer-term needs. Others have needed assistance to resolve problems with their NASS provided accommodation or, having been granted refugee status or other leave to remain, have been left in limbo between the NASS administered support system and the mainstream welfare benefits system, because NASS has failed to issue the relevant documentation. Some have been left for days and sometimes weeks without the means to purchase food and other essential items.

3 Furthermore, both asylum seekers and advisers face great difficulty in contacting those NASS officials able to resolve such problems. The principal issue here is that NASS has no local counter (or ‘drop-in’) services and only a minimal regional presence, and thus seeks to administer what are essentially national housing and social security systems from its offices in Croydon. This lack of local access points has been seriously compounded by an inward looking and stakeholder averse culture within NASS, a paucity of up to date, accurate guidance on how to contact NASS or otherwise resolve problems, and the frequent alteration of NASS’ telephone and fax numbers.

1.8 In 1998 and 1999, the CAB Service opposed many elements of the new asylum support system, arguing that it would "inevitably lead to social exclusion and discrimination" – two social ills that the Government has rightly committed itself to combat in all their forms. Our dismay at the extent to which these fears have been realised – with numerous reports of compulsorily dispersed asylum seekers being subjected to racial violence and harassment – has been compounded by the appalling impact of NASS’ administrative failure on some of the most vulnerable and marginalised individuals in UK society. We consider it unacceptable that men and women who have already faced some of the worst violations of human rights should suffer further due to such an inefficient and unresponsive public service.

1.9 On 29 October 2001, the Government announced the results of two internal reviews of the NASS administered asylum support system – a ‘voucher review’ initiated in late 2000, and a ‘dispersal review’ announced in August 2001. The combined report of the two reviews acknowledged the "poor service by NASS to asylum seekers", and made a number of recommendations for improving the administrative performance of NASS and "offering a better service to asylum seekers and other stakeholders". Subsequently, much of the media reported that the support system established in April 2000 was now being subjected to ‘fundamental reform’ or even ‘phased out’ entirely.

1.10 It is most welcome that the demeaning and stigmatising asylum vouchers (and therefore the much criticised ‘no change’ rule) are to be phased out during 2002, to be replaced by electronic ‘smart cards’ and a payment mechanism that has yet to be fully explained. However, the Government’s only other major innovation – the introduction of asylum reception centres from late 2002 – will provide lodging and on-site support for only 3,000 asylum seekers. With as many as 150,000 men, women and children in the asylum system at any one time, these moves cannot be said to amount to ‘fundamental reform’.

1.11 For the foreseeable future, therefore, the great majority of needy asylum seekers will continue to be supported by the existing NASS administered, dispersal based asylum support system – with subsistence support simply being provided via electronic ‘smart cards’ (or other payment mechanism) rather than vouchers. And, whilst the Government’s report of the voucher and dispersal reviews makes a number of welcome recommendations for improving the administrative performance of NASS, the CAB Service believes that these fall short of what is required to meet the needs of supported asylum seekers. The report’s recommendations also fall short of the minimum that should be expected in the context of the Government’s wider programme for modernising government and improving public services. In particular, the report fails to address the need for NASS to establish adequate local counter services in each of the 70 asylum dispersal areas, as well as in those areas (such as London) where there are many asylum seekers receiving subsistence support only from NASS.

1.12 Since April 2000, and particularly during 2001, Citizens Advice Bureaux (CABx) in the dispersal areas and elsewhere have received an increasing number of advice enquiries from NASS supported asylum seekers needing assistance in dealing with NASS. The vast majority of these advice enquiries have stemmed from delay and/or process error on the part of NASS, together with the inability of the asylum seekers concerned to access NASS directly. Indeed, most of these advice enquiries would not have arisen but for the fundamental inaccessibility of NASS to those it exists to serve.

1.13 It is now widely accepted that NASS has failed to deliver. As noted above, the Government’s report of the voucher and dispersal reviews identifies "real problems" with the system and makes clear that the administrative performance of NASS falls far short of what both supported asylum-seekers and stakeholders can rightly expect. The immigration minister, Lord Rooker, has also stated that "NASS needs to improve its efficiency".

1.14 The Government has committed itself to delivering "efficient, high quality public services" that "meet the needs of citizens, not the convenience of service providers". This laudable aim should also apply to the provision of essential welfare support to needy asylum seekers. We accept that, if fully implemented, many of the recommendations set out in the Government’s report of the voucher and dispersal reviews should improve the service provided by NASS. However, on the basis of the casework experience of CABx, we fear that, unless the key issue of supported asylum seekers’ access to NASS is fully and properly addressed, then many of the problems experienced by CABx and their clients to date in relation to the voucher based asylum support system will simply continue under the proposed smart card based system.

1.15 The aim of this report is to identify those additional steps that need to be taken by the Government to remedy the administrative shortcomings and inaccessibility of NASS. Chapter 2 sets out the background to the establishment of NASS, whilst Chapter 3 describes some of the key developments since April 2000, especially those relating to the NASS related casework now being done by CABx. Chapter 4 sets out some of the evidence from the day-to-day advice work of such CABx during 2001, to illustrate the range and degree of problems faced by NASS supported asylum seekers, and the impact on their lives. Chapter 5 sets out further evidence relating to the difficulties that both asylum-seekers and CAB advisers face in contacting NASS with a view to resolving such problems. This evidence is intended to assist the Government in drawing up customer focused and stakeholder endorsed plans for fundamental reform of the asylum support system. Chapter 6 sets out our recommendations for the scope and nature of such reform.
2. Background: the NASS administered support system

2.1 NASS was established under the Immigration & Asylum Act 1999 to administer, with effect from 3 April 2000, a new national system for the provision of accommodation and subsistence support to otherwise destitute asylum seekers and their dependants, pending final determination of their asylum claim (i.e. including any appeal).

2.2 In the past, the needs of such individuals were met by the mainstream social security system. However, the previous government’s Asylum & Immigration Act 1996, and a number of contrary legal rulings by the courts, effectively reduced these arrangements to chaos. Whilst the 1996 Act removed most asylum seekers’ entitlement to mainstream welfare benefits, the courts soon ruled that the almost forgotten National Assistance Act 1948 could be used to compel local authorities to provide welfare support and accommodation to otherwise destitute asylum seekers. Local authorities were thus drawn into providing such support to tens of thousands of asylum seekers, with disproportionate and unsustainable demands being made of local authorities in London and the South-East in particular.

2.3 By May 1997, few could disagree with the newly installed immigration minister, Mike O’Brien MP, when he described the asylum support system inherited by the incoming Labour government as "a shambles within a shambles" – the larger ‘shambles’ being the asylum determination process as a whole.

2.4 Designed to relieve the pressure on local authorities in London and the South-East, and also to meet the Government’s view that access to social security benefits creates a ‘pull factor’ on economic migration, the asylum support system introduced (in stages) from 3 April 2000 has three key features:

· the exclusion of asylum seekers (and indeed the majority of those "subject to immigration control") from the scope of both the mainstream welfare benefits system and support under the National Assistance Act 1948;

· the enforced ‘dispersal’ of supported asylum seekers away from London and the South-East, to NASS provided accommodation in some 70 asylum dispersal areas in the regions; and

· the provision of most subsistence support in the form of vouchers, redeemable at selected retail outlets only, with just a small cash element (currently £10 per person per week).

2.5 To qualify for NASS support, applicants must demonstrate that they are ‘destitute’ – that is, they have no means of supporting themselves. They may opt for a package of furnished accommodation and subsistence support, or subsistence support only. Accommodation is offered on a no choice basis – successful applicants must accept the accommodation offered, regardless of location, or receive subsistence support only.

2.6 Where an asylum seeker is accommodated by NASS, the cost of all utilities and of Council Tax is met by the accommodation provider (one of some 20 local authorities, housing associations and private sector companies contracted to NASS). On this basis (and also because the support package is intended to be of short duration only), the level of subsistence support is set at 70 per cent of basic Income Support rates (i.e. not including Income Support premiums). Thus, currently, a single adult aged 25 or over receives £36.54 per week (£10 in cash and the rest in vouchers).

2.7 In the words of NASS’ first Director, all this amounts to a "major piece of social engineering". At the outset, ministers declared the aim to be to "ensure that asylum seekers are appropriately placed" in areas where there is already a "multi-cultural population" and the "existence or potential for community and voluntary support groups". Eight regional consortia of local authorities, accommodation providers and other relevant bodies (not including CABx) were established to assist in ensuring that dispersed asylum-seekers "have access to local services (e.g. that their children can gain access to schools and that all asylum seekers have access to the appropriate health services)". In addition, NASS expressed its aim to "develop language-based cluster areas", so as to foster relevant community support and facilitate the integration of those granted refugee status or exceptional leave to remain.

2.8 A further "key element" of the new system was the establishment of ‘one-stop’ advice services in "each of the main regions", funded by NASS but provided by voluntary sector refugee groups (the Refugee Council, Migrant Helpline, Refugee Action and the Refugee Arrivals Project in England, the Welsh Refugee Council in Wales, and the Scottish Refugee Council in Scotland). These ‘reception assistant agencies’ were to "provide advice services to asylum-seekers [dispersed] to the regions and be the focal point for harnessing the work of voluntary and community support in those regions". In the first two years of NASS’ operations, these six organisations received grants totalling £34 million from the Home Office to provide these and other services, including the administration of emergency accommodation for those awaiting a decision on their application to NASS for accommodation and subsistence support.
3. Background: NASS in action

The provision of accommodation

3.1 The provision by NASS of designated accommodation is a key feature of the new support system, with the original intention being to disperse asylum seekers to cluster areas outside the South-East where their language (or at least one they understood) is spoken. However, as the Government’s report of the voucher and dispersal reviews acknowledges, in practice NASS has "had great difficulty in ensuring that dispersals are undertaken on this basis, even from the outset".

3.2 The principal reason for this is that NASS has been unable to secure a sufficient supply of appropriate accommodation, and so invariably the availability of accommodation has been the determining if not the only factor in the placement of an individual or family in a particular dispersal area. One consequence of this has been the dispersal of larger numbers than anticipated to those areas where NASS has been able to secure ample accommodation, much of it in small units (i.e. fewer than six beds) provided by private sector landlords.

3.3 An important factor in this failure to secure an adequate supply of accommodation across the dispersal areas has been an apparent breakdown in the relationship between NASS and some local authorities. This has reportedly led directly to delay in the finalisation of some contracts for accommodation, the withdrawal of some local authorities from other contracts, and the disbandment of at least one of the regional consortia. As a result, NASS has increasingly come to rely on accommodation provided (under contract) by private sector landlords, against some of whom there have been allegations of poor standards, malpractice and even profiteering. The Government’s report of the voucher and dispersal reviews acknowledges that there have been "inconsistencies in the quality of accommodation and support services that are provided by both private and public sector accommodation providers".

The provision of subsistence support

3.4 >From the outset, the provision of subsistence support in the form of vouchers rather than cash benefits attracted strong criticism from a wide range of concerned individuals and organisations. Much of this criticism focused on the fact that retail outlets were prohibited from giving change when accepting vouchers as payment, the stigmatising effect of vouchers, and the associated racial abuse and harassment of asylum-seekers by shop staff and other customers.

1 In 1999, during parliamentary consideration of the Bill that would eventually become the Immigration & Asylum Act 1999, the CAB Service expressed its fear that the "fundamental inadequacy of a voucher based system in relation to the complex and often extensive support needs of asylum seekers" would "inevitably lead to social exclusion and discrimination". In particular, we expressed deep concern about the inadequacy of the proposed level of subsistence support, especially for those asylum seekers with disabilities and health problems (who, unlike mainstream Income Support claimants, receive no extra allowances, or ‘premiums’, in recognition of their additional needs). The experience of CABx from April 2000 onwards shows this fear to have been entirely well founded.

The administrative performance of NASS

3.6 However, the principal and over-riding concern of the CAB Service has been – and remains – that NASS does not provide a sufficiently efficient, responsive and accessible service, and is thus failing both asylum seekers and taxpayers alike.

3.7 As early as the Summer and Autumn of 2000 it was clear that NASS was failing to meet its own performance target for the processing of applications for support. This states that NASS should determine 70 per cent of support applications within two days, and the remainder within a maximum of seven days. Ministers have not provided any relevant statistics, and indeed have confirmed that NASS has no mechanism for monitoring its performance against this key performance target. However, it is clear that NASS has never come anywhere near meeting this target. Throughout 2001, CABx reported numerous cases of NASS taking weeks and even months to determine the application for support. At the extreme, a CAB in central Manchester reports being approached in August 2001 by a family of Iraqi Kurds who had been waiting nine months for determination of their application to NASS.

3.8 Within weeks of NASS going operational on 3 April 2000, CABx began to report a growing number of cases involving delay and/or administrative error on the part of NASS. By December 2000, the CAB Service was concluding (in its submission to the voucher review) that:

"the NASS administered asylum support system as a whole is in crisis, and therefore in urgent need of reform. Indeed, the evidence [from the day-to-day advice work of CABx] strongly suggests that NASS is failing to administer the support system in the manner intended by ministers".

3.9 Although the then Home Secretary stated in October 2000 that this review would be completed and its conclusions reported to Parliament "early" in 2001, the results of the review were not announced until 29 October 2001, as part of the current Home Secretary’s statement to the House of Commons (see Chapter 1).

3.10 During the intervening period, the situation deteriorated further, with CABx reporting unprecedented numbers of cases of inordinate delay and/or process error on the part of NASS. And a key factor in this deterioration was the scaling down, from May 2001, of some of the ‘one-stop’ advice services provided by the NASS funded reception assistant agencies, Refugee Action and the Refugee Council.

The provision of relevant advice and assistance

3.11 In April 2001, Refugee Action announced that, due to unforeseen pressures of new arrivals in its emergency accommodation and inadequate NASS funding, it intended to "phase out" its Manchester based ‘drop-in’ service by 21 May 2001 and to refer NASS-supported asylum-seekers needing advice and/or assistance to "other agencies". From late May 2001 onwards, CABx in Central and Greater Manchester, and elsewhere in Lancashire and the North-West, began to receive substantial numbers of advice enquiries from NASS supported asylum seekers, most of them referred directly by Refugee Action. In July, for example, Manchester District CAB dealt with a total of 217 such cases, compared with just six cases in May. In the same month Wigan CAB dealt with 51 such cases, having dealt with none at all between 3 April 2000 and 31 March 2001.

3.12 Similarly, in August 2001, the Refugee Council informed NACAB that it was scaling down its ‘one-stop’ advice services in South Yorkshire, with immediate effect. In the following weeks, CABx in the Sheffield area received increasing numbers of advice enquiries from NASS supported asylum seekers. Subsequently, the Refugee Council informed NACAB that, due to changes in its NASS funding, it intended to scale down its ‘one-stop’ advice services in London, with effect from 30 November.

3.13 On 11 August 2001, seemingly in response to the racially-motivated murder in Glasgow on 5 August of dispersed asylum-seeker Firsat Yildiz, the Home Secretary announced a review of "how dispersal operates on the ground" and of "the support systems currently in place". In contrast to the October 2000 review of the voucher scheme, no invitation was issued to relevant stakeholders and interested parties to make submissions to this dispersal review. The results of this review formed part of the Home Secretary’s statement to the House of Commons on 29 October 2001.

3.14 Throughout 2001, as in 2000, the vast majority of NASS related cases dealt with by CABx involved one or more of the following:

· non-receipt of NASS vouchers, leaving the individual without vouchers or cash for food and other essential living needs;

· problems relating to the standard and/or suitability of NASS provided accommodation;

· a failure on the part of NASS to respond to a change of circumstances, and thus to amend the level of voucher support;

· problems with obtaining a NASS travel warrant for attendance at a Home Office IND asylum interview or appeal hearing;

· a need for assistance with applying to NASS for a £50 supplementary cash grant (available to those who have been supported by NASS for more than six months);

· delay in the issue of NASS Form 35 (confirmation of the termination of NASS support) following the grant of refugee status or exceptional leave to remain, leading to problems claiming mainstream welfare benefits.

3.9 The CAB Service is wholeheartedly committed to providing an open door advice service, and to playing its part in meeting the advice needs of asylum seekers and others seeking admission to the UK. Every year, CABx in England, Wales and Northern Ireland deal with some 50,000 immigration, asylum and nationality enquiries. The CAB Service shares the Government’s belief that Britain can be "a model of a multicultural, multi-racial society", and is thus proud to be able to offer its services to so many of those seeking admission to or settlement in the UK.

3.10 The large and unanticipated number of asylum support enquiries made to CABx in the NASS-designated dispersal areas in recent months – especially following the scaling down of some of the NASS funded ‘one-stop’ advice services – has placed, and continues to place, a substantial strain on the limited financial and human resources of some CABx. These CAB have not had an opportunity to plan and seek specific funding for the meeting of such demand.

3.11 In particular, whilst CABx are generally well equipped with language skills relevant to the local population, their staff and volunteers do not have ability in the languages of many of the asylum seekers dispersed to their localities by NASS. For example, Bolton District CAB offers its advice services in English, Gujerati, Bengali, Hindi, Urdu and Punjabi – but the majority of asylum seekers wanting assistance from the bureau in relation to NASS have been Afghani and Iraqi. Similarly, in the month of July 2001 alone Manchester District CAB dealt with asylum seekers from Afghanistan, Angola, the Czech Republic, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Turkey and Zaire.

3.12 The Home Office minister, Bob Ainsworth MP, has suggested to NACAB that CABx should resolve the problem of communicating with asylum seeker clients by using "other asylum seekers with a better command of English as interpreters". However, setting aside the problematic issues of training, client confidentiality and the matching of language skills to demand, it is hardly practical – or appropriate – to ask asylum seekers to volunteer such services at a time when they are without NASS vouchers and cash for food and other essential items.

3.13 The Government has repeatedly maintained that, under the asylum support system introduced in April 2000, the advice and assistance needs of asylum seekers in relation to that system would be met by the specialist, NASS funded ‘one-stop’ service providers, such as Refugee Action and the Refugee Council. Indeed, the Home Office’s website currently states that "each area has a ‘one-stop service’ to provide support and advice for asylum seekers and refugees". Clearly, in some regions the combination of poor NASS service delivery and inadequate NASS funding of the voluntary sector ‘one-stop’ service providers has frustrated and overwhelmed the proper fulfillment of this aim.

3.14 As a result, NASS supported asylum seekers who are subjected to administrative delay and/or process error on the part of NASS are having to seek assistance from the CAB Service or other advice agencies (where they exist). In our view, primary responsibility for dealing with such casework problems should lie with NASS itself – just as, in the mainstream welfare benefits system, the Benefits Agency deals with such basic casework problems through its local benefits offices. In general, the first port of call of a mainstream welfare benefits claimant with a problem relating to the delivery of his or her benefits is not the local CAB or other advice agency, but the local benefits office. Only where there is a dispute over entitlement, or the problem is less than straightforward, should such an individual need to access independent advice and assistance.

3.15 The CAB Service believes that NASS supported asylum seekers who experience problems with the delivery of their NASS support should be able to approach NASS directly at dedicated counter or ‘drop-in’ services in their dispersal area. Clearly, such individuals may also need to access independent advice – including legal advice and representation – if the problem is complex and/or there is a dispute about entitlement. However, the experience of CABx during 2001, as described in the following two chapters, suggests that, given effective access to responsive, local NASS counter services, most such casework problems could be resolved by asylum seekers themselves, without outside intervention.

4. NASS in crisis: the evidence from CABx

4.1 This chapter sets out a representative selection of the asylum support related evidence submitted to NACAB by CABx since 1 January 2001, so as to illustrate the nature and degree of problems encountered by NASS supported asylum seekers. In some cases, key details have been omitted to ensure client confidentiality.

Accommodation-related problems

4.2 Asylum seekers supported and provided with accommodation by NASS may be housed in one of several different types of accommodation, including self-contained flats or houses, and hostels with either full board or self-catering facilities. Much of this accommodation is provided under contract by local authorities and housing associations. However, some 60 per cent is provided under contract by private sector companies, some of whom subcontract accommodation from smaller, private sector landlords.

4.3 If the aims of NASS set out in paragraph 2.7 are to be met, it is vital that a supported individual or family is allocated to suitable accommodation of an appropriate standard. This might mean, for example, that the needs of older or disabled family members are taken into account, and that there is adequate room for all the family members. However, CABx report a steady stream of advice enquiries in relation to accommodation that is clearly unsuitable for the individuals concerned and/or of a poor standard.

A CAB in Birmingham reports assisting an epileptic man who had been living in a NASS provided, supposedly self-contained and fully furnished flat for the past 11 months. In fact, the accommodation was only part furnished, and had no cooking facilities. The client had bought a second hand cooker and microwave several months previously, but neither now work and he cannot afford to replace them.

The NASS provided accommodation of a single Nigerian woman who sought assistance from a CAB in Lancashire was in very poor condition and had no heating or cooking facilities. The landlord and workmen had been entering the property to undertake repair work without her permission, and she was "afraid for her safety".

A family of Iranian asylum seekers, including two young children, who sought assistance from a CAB in Central Manchester had contracted scabies from old and dirty carpet in their NASS provided accommodation. The family had previously approached the accommodation provider, but nothing had been done.

A CAB in Yorkshire reports assisting a non English speaking Czech man with a young family, housed in accommodation provided by a private sector landlord under sub-contract from one of the main private sector accommodation providers. The client wanted to obtain a cot for his young baby, together with additional kitchen utensils. An adviser contacted the accommodation provider, only to be told that the client had all the kitchen utensils he needs and that "these people always ask for bigger pans because they cook big pans of crap".

The NASS provided accommodation of an Iranian man who sought assistance from a CAB in central Manchester was infested with mice, had no hot water, and had a broken shower and insecure locks. The client had initially sought assistance from Refugee Action (i.e. the local NASS funded, ‘one-stop’ advice provider), only to be referred to the CAB.

4.4 In addition, CABx report many cases of NASS supported asylum seekers needing assistance with a request to NASS to transfer to alternative accommodation, for example following racial abuse or harassment by local residents.

A non English speaking woman who sought assistance from a CAB in Yorkshire was being harassed by local residents and so had asked NASS to provide alternative accommodation, but had received no response. The bureau faxed a letter to NASS immediately, and did so again two weeks later, but received no response. Three weeks later the client returned to the bureau, having still not received any response from NASS. An adviser telephoned the number given on the back of the NASS accommodation complaints form, only to be told that the number had changed; after ten minutes on hold, waiting to be put through to the right department, the line went dead. The bureau then faxed a third letter to NASS.

A CAB in Staffordshire reports being approached by a group of 16 Iraqi and Afghan men wanting to leave their NASS provided accommodation as a result of a series of serious racial abuse and threats of violence from local residents.

An Iraqi man with serious mental health problems who sought assistance from a CAB in Central Manchester had recently had his NASS support terminated after damaging his accommodation, and had subsequently been living on the streets. Whilst sleeping rough, he had been beaten up so badly that he required hospital treatment. In addition to NASS, the bureau approached ten local agencies, but none could offer any advice or assistance; the man eventually left the bureau to "get food from Manchester Cathedral’s soup kitchen".

Subsistence support related problems

4.5 Under the soon to be phased out voucher scheme, asylum seekers supported by NASS regularly receive a book of receipts that can be exchanged, at weekly intervals, for vouchers and cash at a main post office. The vouchers can then be redeemed in a network of retail outlets. However, since April 2000 CABx have reported numerous cases of asylum seekers being left without vouchers and cash, either because they have not received a new book of receipts from NASS, or because there are no vouchers in their name at the post office at which they normally exchange their receipts. NASS seemingly has no procedure to deal with such emergencies.

A young Somali woman who sought assistance from a CAB in Central Manchester had not received any NASS vouchers or cash for the past two weeks. The client now had no vouchers with which to buy food, but when the bureau contacted NASS it was told that it would take "at least" another five days to send out a new supply of voucher receipts. Faced with a desperate, hungry young woman, the bureau could do no more than issue her with a ticket for a food parcel from a local soup kitchen.

A CAB in Greater London reports assisting a family of seven Algerian asylum seekers, including five children. Over a ten week period, the bureau had to contact NASS on 13 separate occasions as, twice during this period, the family’s supply of voucher receipts expired without a further supply being received and they were left without vouchers or cash for food and other essential items. Invariably, the bureau’s telephone calls to NASS were met with the suggestion that the bureau get in touch again if the vouchers are not received within "the next five days".

About eight weeks after first contacting the CAB, the family was re-housed by NASS following a violent racial attack by local residents, but NASS subsequently sent a new supply of voucher receipts to the family’s previous address. On two occasions the bureau was told that the NASS computers did not show whether voucher receipts had been sent to the family, and several promises by NASS officials to call back with clarification of the situation were not fulfilled. Two weeks later, still without NASS vouchers and cash, the family was relying on Salvation Army food parcels and the children could not attend school as the family had no money for bus fares.

The voucher supply of an Afghan man who sought assistance from a CAB in Lancashire had expired two days previously, and he had received no further receipts from NASS. The bureau contacted NASS and was told that a further supply would be sent out "within five days". Seven days later the client returned to the bureau as he had still not received any further receipts from NASS. By this time he had been without vouchers and cash for nine days, and had been relying on friends for food and other essential items.

4.6 In many such cases, the asylum seeker concerned has previously sought assistance from the local NASS funded, ‘one-stop’ advice provider, only to be referred to a CAB without the problem being addressed and resolved. For example:

A CAB in Greater Manchester reports assisting an Iraqi man in respect of a sudden interruption in the supply of his voucher receipts from NASS. He had previously sought assistance on this matter from Refugee Action, only to be referred to the CAB. The bureau comments in its report to NACAB: "It must have taken Refugee Action the same amount of time to discuss the problem with the client and refer him to us as it would have done to call NASS and resolve the problem."

4.7 Problems relating specifically to the issuing of vouchers should disappear with the proposed replacement of vouchers with an electronic smart card or automated credit transfer system during 2002. However, it is inevitable that NASS supported asylum seekers will experience day-to-day problems with the new payment mechanism (lost and stolen smart cards, for example). Indeed, an electronic smart card that gives direct access to cash is likely to be highly susceptible to theft, misuse (including coercion of the card holder) and fraud. The then Department of Social Security (now the Department for Work & Pensions) has already abandoned proposals to introduce an electronic smart card for mainstream welfare benefits claimants, due to the likely problems with administering such a system effectively.

Problems obtaining the £50 NASS supplementary grant

4.8 Perhaps the most common casework problem reported by CABx is the difficulty that many asylum seekers face in obtaining the £50 supplementary cash grant that is due to them after they have been supported by NASS for six months.

4.9 As noted in Chapter 2, the level of subsistence support provided by NASS is set at 70 per cent of basic Income Support rates. The Government has justified this on the grounds that NASS supported asylum seekers do not have to meet utility bills and other costs, and also on the grounds that the Home Office Immigration & Nationality Directorate (IND) intends to fully resolve most asylum claims (i.e. including any appeal against an initial refusal) within six months. In other words, the NASS support package is intended to be of short duration only, and thus the level of support does not cover longer-term needs (such as the replacement of worn-out clothing).

4.10 The establishment of a separate asylum support system, administered by NASS, formed part of a wide ranging package of administrative and legislative reform of the asylum determination process. The key aims of this reform package were to substantially reduce the time taken to fully resolve asylum claims, and to increase the number of unsuccessful asylum applicants removed from the UK. In 1998, the Government committed itself to the so-called "2 + 4" formula: the initial determination of "70 per cent" of asylum claims within two months, and the determination of any appeal within an "average" of four months. As late as July 2000, ministers were stating that this overall performance target was to be met "by March 2001".

4.11 It is clear that the Government is still a long way from meeting this performance target, despite the target having been partially lowered (to the initial determination of "60 per cent" of asylum claims within two months). In December 2001, the Government stated that the Home Office IND is determining only "about 50 per cent" of asylum claims within two months. And, since January 2000 the backlog of unheard asylum appeals has risen from 6,600 to over 70,000. In the 12 month period ending 30 September 2001, it took an average of six months to determine an asylum appeal. Accordingly, there is no question that large numbers of asylum seekers are spending longer than six months in the NASS support system.

4.12 Under the Asylum Support Regulations 2000, an asylum seeker who has been supported by NASS "for at least six months" without his or her asylum claim having been fully determined may "apply for an additional single cash payment [of £50] in respect of essential living needs" (i.e. the payment is not automatic). Further applications may be made after 12 months of being supported by NASS, after 18 months, and so on.

4.13 NASS has stated that its processing of such applications "should take no more than three weeks". However, CABx report numerous cases of asylum seekers waiting considerably longer than three weeks for a response to their application for the £50 cash payment.

An Iranian woman who sought assistance from a CAB in Central Manchester had applied to NASS for the £50 cash grant more than two months previously, but had received no response.

Another CAB in Central Manchester reports being approached by an Iraqi man who had been in receipt of NASS support for more than 13 months (and thus qualified for two £50 grants). The client had applied for a £50 grant several weeks previously, but had not received a reply. When the CAB adviser telephoned NASS he was told that this application had been received two months ago; however, because of "a backlog" it had not yet been processed and the client would "have to wait". The adviser submitted a written application in respect of the second £50 grant now due to the client.

A CAB in Yorkshire that contacted NASS in respect of an application for a £50 grant at much the same time as the case above was given conflicting information: that the client would receive a response "within three to five working days". However, three weeks later the client returned to the bureau as he had not received a response from NASS.

4.14 In recent months this has been one of the most common problems in cases dealt with by CABx. Bolton District CAB, for example, reports that 219 (69 per cent) of the 319 asylum seekers who approached the bureau in the period 1 June – 16 October 2001 needed assistance with their application for a £50 cash grant. The bureau reports that in the majority of these cases the clients had previously made several attempts to resolve the problem themselves, without success.

Problems obtaining a NASS travel warrant

4.15 As the level of subsistence support provided by NASS does not include an allowance for the cost of travel to obligatory Home Office IND asylum interviews or asylum appeal hearings, an asylum seeker supported by NASS has been supposed to receive a travel warrant for such purposes from NASS as necessary. NASS has stated that "travel arrangements for asylum interviews will normally be automatic", with NASS sending the supported asylum seeker a travel warrant "upon notification of an asylum interview" by Home Office IND. As a failure to attend an asylum interview or appeal hearing is likely to seriously prejudice the outcome of the asylum claim or appeal, and as NASS vouchers are not accepted by any transport providers, the timely provision of a travel warrant has been an essential function of NASS.

4.16 However, CABx have reported numerous cases of NASS supported asylum seekers being called to a Home Office IND asylum interview or appeal hearing without receiving the associated travel warrant from NASS. Moreover, in the great majority of such cases the short notice of the asylum interview precludes the making of a written application to NASS for a travel warrant, especially given that NASS requires "five working days" to process such applications.

A man who sought assistance from a CAB in Staffordshire, having recently been dispersed to the area by NASS, had received on a Friday notification of an asylum interview at the Home Office IND in Liverpool the following Wednesday. He approached the bureau as he had insufficient money to cover the cost of travelling to Liverpool, and the short notice precluded making an application to NASS for a travel warrant. When the bureau contacted NASS it was told only that non-receipt of a travel warrant is not a valid reason for failing to attend an interview, and so the bureau paid for the client’s travel to Liverpool. The NASS official failed to inform the bureau that the cost of travel could be claimed retrospectively from NASS by the client.

A CAB in Central Manchester reports being approached by an Iraqi man whose supply of vouchers had expired four weeks previously and who had received no further voucher receipts from NASS. He had recently been called to a Home Office asylum interview in Liverpool but had no means to cover the associated travel costs. As there was insufficient time to submit an application for a travel warrant, the bureau contacted NASS by telephone, only to be told that the client would have to "find the money" and apply for re-imbursement at a later date.

4.17 In some of these cases, the problem might easily have been avoided by more effective co-ordination between decisions of NASS and decisions of other parts of the Home Office IND. For example:

A CAB in Greater Manchester reports assisting a single woman with a young child. The client had been dispersed from emergency accommodation in London to NASS provided accommodation in Lancashire, despite having a long-standing appointment for an asylum interview at the Home Office IND in Croydon just five days later. Because there was insufficient time to apply to NASS for a travel warrant, the bureau contacted NASS to be told only that the cost of travelling to the interview could be claimed retrospectively from NASS.

However, the timing of the interview (9am) required the client to travel to London the day before and incur the cost of an overnight stay – but a NASS official told the bureau that "while we will refund her travel costs we aren’t going to pay for her accommodation". This is contrary to NASS policy bulletin 56, which states that NASS may cover accommodation costs where "overnight accommodation is required but NASS is unable to arrange it". As the bureau comments in its report to NACAB: "the sensible thing would have been to delay the client’s dispersal until after the interview. This isn’t rocket science, just common sense".
4.18 Furthermore, CABx have reported dealing with cases of long delay in the re-imbursement by NASS of travel costs claimed retrospectively by a NASS supported asylum seeker. For example:

An Iraqi man who sought assistance from a CAB in Central Manchester had been waiting more than four months for re-imbursement of the cost of travel to a Home Office asylum interview. When an adviser telephoned NASS she was told that it could be "another two months" before payment was made.

Non-response to changes in asylum seekers’ circumstances

4.19 For a variety of reasons, the circumstances of supported asylum seekers change over time. And, in many cases, the change of circumstances is such that a change in the level or nature of NASS support is required. However, NASS is often inordinately slow in responding to such changes in circumstances, with the result that supported asylum seekers go for periods of up to several weeks without receiving the level of support to which they are entitled.

A single Somali woman with a young daughter who sought assistance from a CAB in Greater London had received no support from NASS, despite having applied for accommodation and subsistence support some three months previously. In the meantime, the client had been living in accommodation provided by a friend – himself a disabled person living on Income Support. An adviser contacted NASS, to be told that, some three weeks previously, the client had changed her application from accommodation and subsistence support to subsistence support only, and this was being treated as a ‘change in circumstances’ that takes "three weeks to process".

A CAB in Central Manchester reports being approached by a single woman who had recently given birth but whose voucher allowance had not been increased accordingly, despite her having faxed a letter to NASS several weeks previously.

A young Iranian woman who sought assistance from another CAB in Central Manchester had moved from NASS provided accommodation into privately rented accommodation some two months previously. Despite informing NASS of this change of circumstances and address, she had subsequently not received any new voucher receipts from NASS. As a result, she had now gone for ten days without vouchers or cash for food, and was being financially supported by friends.

4.20 Furthermore, NASS sometimes fails to identify, and pre-empt, basic changes in circumstances that are inevitable and predictable. For example, the level of subsistence support given to single adults who are aged 25 and over is greater than that given to those aged 18 to 24. And yet the level of support does not appear to change automatically when a young adult male reaches the age of 25. In many cases dealt with by CABx the individual has had to notify NASS and request the higher level of support, thus generating unnecessary administration for NASS as well as inconvenience and uncertainty for the supported asylum seeker.

An Afghani man who sought assistance from a CAB in Central Manchester had reached the age of 25 some four months previously, but his voucher allowance had still not increased (from £28.95 to £36.54 per week) accordingly. He had already written twice to NASS about this, but had received no response.

Another CAB in Central Manchester reports being approached by a single Iranian man who had reached the age of 25 some three months previously but whose voucher allowance had still not increased accordingly. The client had initially sought assistance from Refugee Action (i.e. the local NASS funded, ‘one-stop’ advice provider), only to be referred to a local law centre, which had in turn referred him to the CAB.

An Afghani man who sought assistance from a CAB in Yorkshire had reached the age of 25 some eight months previously, but his voucher allowance had still not increased accordingly. He had also not received a second £50 supplementary grant, despite having been supported by NASS for more than 12 months.

Access to health, education and other services

4.21 The creation of what is essentially an entirely separate welfare support system for asylum seekers inevitably carries the potential for problems at the necessary interface between that system and other public services, such as health and education. Many of the cases reported to NACAB by CABx involve problems of this nature, with some illustrating a lack of understanding on the part of NASS officials of the inevitably complex system they are administering. For example:

A CAB in Lancashire reports assisting an Iraqi man whose NASS Form HC2 (full help with health care costs) had expired a few days previously and which he wanted renewed so as to enable him to continue to receive vital medication. An adviser rang the HC2 helpline number given on the form, only to be told to contact the main NASS helpline. After eventually getting through to the main helpline, the adviser was given the client’s NASS reference number only to be transferred to another NASS official, who informed the adviser that NASS "doesn’t deal with health costs".

The adviser then rang the HC2 helpline number again and, after being put on hold for 20 minutes, was transferred to yet another NASS official. After a further 10 minutes on hold, the adviser was told that NASS Form HC2 could not be renewed over the ‘phone and that the client would have to submit a written application for renewal. When asked why, the NASS official stated that this was because "anybody could ‘phone up" – or, as the bureau puts it, "anyone with the patience of Job and a devil-may-care attitude to ‘phone bills could ‘phone up". When the adviser pointed out that "anybody could write in", he was again put on hold but eventually the official came back on the line to say that the client’s Form HC2 would be renewed and sent out "in a few days".

4.22 Other cases illustrate the failure of the NASS support system to address all the welfare needs of asylum seekers, especially those who have spent some considerable time in the support system. For example:

A CAB in Central Manchester reports being approached by a Kenyan woman wanting help with purchasing compulsory school uniforms for her two children. The local authority had refused her application for a school uniform grant and NASS makes no specific provision for meeting such additional needs. Previous research by NACAB has found that the cost of compulsory school uniforms can exceed £250, and that many schools will exclude pupils who do not wear the correct uniform.

An Afghani man who sought assistance from another CAB in Central Manchester was suffering from ulcers and wanted to know whether he could obtain additional financial support to cover his associated special dietary needs. An adviser telephoned NASS, only to be told that NASS cannot meet such additional needs.

The same CAB reports being approached by a Czech woman suffering from a severe skin disorder and wanting additional financial help to cover her associated dietary and other needs. Again, an adviser contacted NASS, only to be told that NASS makes no special provision for those with disabilities or health problems involving additional needs.

Delay in the issue of NASS Form 35

4.23 Under the Asylum Support Regulations 2000, a NASS supported asylum seeker who is granted refugee status or exceptional leave to remain becomes ineligible for NASS support 14 days after the Home Office IND notifies him or her of the decision. This ‘grace period’ is supposed to allow the individual or family to find alternative accommodation (where previously provided by NASS) and income.

4.24 In the great majority of cases, of course, finding an alternative income means accessing the mainstream welfare benefits system. However, this system can only be accessed once the individual has received NASS Form 35, a laminated certificate of confirmation of the termination of NASS support bearing the individual’s photograph. This procedure is intended to prevent fraudulent applications for welfare benefits by those refused support by NASS and those whose NASS support has been terminated for reasons other than a grant of refugee status or ELR. Form 35 is supposed to be issued automatically at the time that NASS support is terminated.

4.25 However, CABx report numerous cases of individuals granted either refugee status or exceptional leave to remain not receiving a Form 35 from NASS. In the absence of a Form 35, such individuals are unable to pursue an application for mainstream welfare benefits.

A single Sierra Leonean man who sought assistance from a CAB in Staffordshire had not received a Form 35, despite being granted exceptional leave to remain more than two months previously. As a result, he had been unable to pursue his application for benefits.

A CAB in Central London reports assisting a Somali lone mother who, some four months after being granted exceptional to remain, had still not received a Form 35 and so had been unable to pursue an application for welfare benefits. When an adviser contacted NASS an official stated that there is a backlog of 9,000 cases awaiting issue of Form 35 and that because of "a problem with the computer system" these have to be processed "by hand".

A Somali woman with five children who approached a CAB in Central Manchester had been granted exceptional leave to remain seven weeks previously, but had still not received Form 35. As a result, the Benefits Agency was refusing to process her application for welfare benefits.

4.26 The Government has stated that "in no case does [NASS] support cease until the NASS Form 35 is issued. NASS provides support until this form is issued and, currently, for 14 days thereafter". However, CABx report a steady stream of cases where NASS support has been terminated without Form 35 having been isssued, leaving the individual in limbo between the NASS support system and the mainstream welfare benefits system. In some such cases, the individual has been left for weeks without any form of income. For example:

An Afghani man who approached a CAB in Central Manchester had been granted refugee status some three months previously and had had his NASS support terminated 14 days later. However, he had still not received a Form 35 from NASS and had now been without any form of financial support for more than ten weeks, during which time he had been fed and housed by NASS supported friends.

A CAB in Greater London reports assisting a single Afghani man who had not received a Form 35, despite having been granted exceptional leave to remain two months previously. The Benefits Agency was refusing to process his application for social security benefits and, his NASS support having been terminated 14 days after the grant of leave, he had had no income at all for six weeks and was borrowing off friends to feed himself. The bureau wrote to NASS, but received no reply.

4.27 In many such cases, NASS has failed to respond to the individual’s – and sometimes also an adviser’s – attempts to remedy the failure to issue a Form 35. For example:

A CAB in Central London reports the case of a Somali man who, despite being granted refugee status four months previously, and having had his NASS support terminated 14 days later, had still not been able to obtain social security benefits due to delay in the issue of a correct Form 35. A Form 35 sent to him one month after being granted refugee status had contained significant errors and had had to be returned to NASS after the Benefits Agency refused to accept it.

Three months later, NASS had still not issued a correct Form 35, despite the client’s best efforts to pursue the matter. The client told the bureau: "I am grateful to the Home Office for its benevolence in granting me asylum in this great country. But I cannot possibly understand why I am subjected to such inhumane hardship. I feel completely lost being plunged into such a precarious position".
5. Communication with NASS

5.1 As the evidence from CABx set out in the previous chapter shows, it is essential that individuals needing assistance from NASS – and also their advisers – are able to contact NASS quickly and easily to resolve urgent and longer term problems. As a provider of essential social welfare services, NASS should be expected to meet modern standards of central government service delivery. Although NASS has established a number of dedicated telephone helplines, the evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that such measures are inadequate to meet the needs of more than 50,000 supported individuals, many of whom speak little if any English.

Day-to-day communication with NASS

5.2 An almost universal feature of the asylum support related evidence submitted to NACAB by CABx since April 2000 is the difficulty that both asylum seekers themselves and CAB advisers face in trying to contact NASS with a view to resolving a problem. CAB advisers spend a great deal of their time dealing with service providers in the public and private sector. However, the asylum support related cases reported to NACAB, and the accompanying comments by CAB staff and volunteers, suggest that dealing with NASS presents an unusually demanding challenge even to the most experienced and tenacious adviser.

A CAB in Central London reports the case of an elderly Somali man, with health problems and speaking only a little English, who had applied to NASS for support and accommodation some four months previously. NASS had subsequently offered him accommodation in Yorkshire, at which point he decided to stay with relatives in London instead and so changed his application to subsistence support only. Some five weeks later, when he sought advice from the CAB, he had not had a response from NASS. Over the next three days, a CAB adviser spent a total of two hours on the telephone to NASS, being "transferred from one number to another with no one accepting responsibility". Eventually, the adviser was informed by NASS that emergency vouchers would be sent "immediately". When these did not arrive, the bureau made a further series of calls to NASS, which – two weeks later – resulted in the issue of emergency vouchers.

The same bureau reports being approached by another Somali man who had applied to NASS for subsistence support two weeks previously but had not received a response. An adviser telephoned NASS but was told to call another number, which he did. The adviser was then put on hold for 15 minutes, before the line went dead. The following day the adviser successfully called again, and was told that the client would hear "within a week". A week later, not having heard from NASS, the adviser telephoned again and, after being put on hold for more than ten minutes, was told that, due to "a backlog", it would be another two weeks before a decision was made.

Two weeks later, neither the client nor the bureau having heard from NASS, the bureau telephoned NASS once more. After taking details, an official promised to call back – but did not. Two days later, the bureau telephoned NASS again, but was put on hold and after 15 minutes gave up. Later the same day, after a further 15 minutes on hold, the CAB adviser managed to speak to an official who stated that emergency vouchers had now been issued. The official further stated that, in the event that the vouchers were not received, the client should call the NASS voucher helpline, but as there are "only two staff" it may be "hard to get through".

A single, non English speaking Somali woman with four young children who sought assistance from a CAB in Central Manchester had been granted indefinite leave to remain more than six months previously, but had still not received a NASS Form 35. An English-speaking friend had telephoned NASS on her behalf on at least 15 separate occasions with a view to expediting the issue of a Form 35, without success. When an adviser contacted NASS, an official stated that there was "some confusion" as there were two Home Office IND letters on the client’s NASS file, one granting the client indefinite leave to remain and one refusing her asylum claim, and that the client would have to be "patient" while NASS "tries to clarify the matter". Three weeks later, however, neither the client nor the bureau had heard further from NASS, and so the bureau faxed a letter to NASS.

A CAB in Nottinghamshire reports being approached by an Iraqi man who had been granted exceptional leave to remain some five months previously but who had still not received a Form 35 from NASS. In its report to NACAB, the bureau states: "it is impossible to get through to the NASS helpline as the number seems to be permanently engaged".

5.3 A key factor frustrating day-to-day communication with NASS has been the frequency with which NASS has changed its various dedicated telephone and fax numbers, and the poor advertisement of such changes, even within NASS. This has resulted in CAB advisers attempting to call NASS on numbers that prove to be unobtainable or to have been re-allocated to another part of NASS, and faxing letters to fax numbers that, unknown to the sender, are no longer operative.

A CAB in Greater London reports the case of a single man who, with the assistance of the Refugee Council, had applied to NASS for subsistence support only some eight weeks previously but had not received a response. He had been unable to get through to NASS by telephone; as a result, he had no money or vouchers and was relying on the financial support of friends. An adviser telephoned NASS, and waited in a queue for 15 minutes only to be told to call a different NASS number. This number then proved unobtainable, and calls to another NASS number provided by a local refugee community group went unanswered.

A Kosovan man who sought assistance from a CAB in Central Manchester, having been referred from Refugee Action, needed assistance with applying to NASS for a travel warrant in respect of an appeal hearing. An adviser completed the NASS application form sent to the client with the notification of interview, and faxed it to the number given on the form. However, when the adviser telephoned NASS three days later to enquire about progress – the appeal hearing being imminent – she was told that the fax number had changed, and that the bureau’s fax had presumably not been received by NASS.

Similarly, another CAB in Central Manchester reports how it realised in July 2001 that the fax number that it had previously been given (by NASS) to use in respect of ‘changes in circumstances’ cases was different to that given on the NASS documentation held by its clients. An adviser telephoned NASS, using the number the bureau had previously been given (by NASS) for the ‘change in circumstances’ department, only to be told that the number was now the ‘terminations’ department of NASS, and to be given a third fax number (as well as a new ‘phone number) for the ‘change of circumstances’ department.

5.4 As the last bureau comments in its report to NACAB, the frequent alteration of fax numbers "means that NASS has to be contacted by telephone to confirm the fax number" before faxing a letter or application form to a department of NASS. And, as illustrated in so many of the cases described above, it can take a considerable time to get through to NASS by telephone.

5.5 In some cases, attempts by a CAB adviser to resolve a client’s problem have been further frustrated by an apparent lack of clarity on the role and precise responsibilities of the voluntary sector reception assistant agencies. The Government’s report of the voucher and dispersal reviews acknowledges "a lack of understanding or consistent view of the dispersal process and roles of individuals within the process, by NASS and associatied agencies" with some of the reception assistant agencies "not demonstrating a clear understanding of their own role, with potential conflicts between acting as agents of NASS and providing an advisory role to the asylum-seeker". For example:

A CAB in Central Manchester reports being approached by a young Indian man, in receipt of subsistence support only, who now wished to apply for NASS accommodation. An adviser telephoned NASS, but was told to refer the client to Refugee Action. However, when the adviser then telephoned Refugee Action she was told that she or the client should approach NASS. The adviser therefore telephoned NASS again, only to be told once more that the matter should be dealt with by Refugee Action.

Consultation with NASS stakeholders

5.6 The difficulties that CABx face in dealing with NASS on a day-to-day basis have been compounded by the demise of the NASS asylum support stakeholder group. Established by the Home Office in 1998 with the aim of facilitating a meaningful dialogue between NASS (then in formation) and its future social partners and stakeholders, including NACAB, the group met regularly during 1999 but has not met since NASS went operational in April 2000.

5.7 Since November 2000, NACAB has repeatedly pressed NASS to re-establish regular meetings of the stakeholder group, so as to report CAB clients’ experience and seek information for CABx. In the course of an extensive correspondence, NASS stated in February 2001 that the stakeholder group had been disbanded having "fulfilled its purpose", and that "the way forward now is to work through smaller, regional stakeholder groups based on the areas covered by the local authority regional consortia". However, as far as NACAB is aware, few if any CABx have yet been invited to participate in such regional stakeholder groups. Indeed, it is not clear whether such groups actually exist in some of the areas covered by the regional consortia.

5.8 In July 2001, the immigration minister, Angela Eagle MP, announced that "plans are being made to establish a new national forum on asylum support issues". To date, however, no such forum has been established, and NASS remains the only operational division of the Home Office IND without an associated user panel or stakeholder group. By contrast, the Asylum Support Adjudicators – the governmental body that hears and determines appeals against a refusal or termination of NASS support – have run an effective stakeholder group from the outset.

5.9 The CAB Service believes that the establishment of such a national forum for dialogue between NASS and its social partners and stakeholders is essential to ensure that NACAB (and thus all CABx) are kept fully informed of developments in NASS’ operational policy, and to enable evidence of operational problems to be fed back to senior officials and solutions identified. The Government’s report of the voucher and dispersal reviews acknowledges that "better communication channels need to be established between NASS and other agencies", so as to "allow for better preparation [by such stakeholders] in regard to the services required, including legal and interpretation [services]". This must now be a priority for ministers.
Conclusions and recommendations

6.1 It is clear from the CAB evidence described above that the great majority of the NASS related advice enquiries dealt with by CABx arise out of serious and widespread administrative failure on the part of NASS, compounded by the acute inaccessibility of NASS. In most such cases, CABx are providing not advice as such, but a ‘helping hand’ in breaking down that inaccessibility. This ‘helping hand’ may take the form of telephone communication with NASS officials, the completion of the relevant NASS form, and/or the transmission of information to NASS by fax. In effect, and especially with the reduction of some of the specialist, ‘one-stop’ advice services of the NASS funded reception assistant agencies, CABx in the asylum dispersal areas are providing services that should be provided by NASS itself.

6.2 CABx have not had an opportunity to plan and seek funding for such unanticipated casework demand. As a result, the immense demands being made of CABx in the NASS designated dispersal areas in respect of asylum support have brought unwanted tension into the relationship between such CABx and their local population, and to community relations generally. All people in the community who wish to use the CAB Service feel the effects when a CAB is not able to respond to them as quickly as it might have done previously. A number of CABx have reported receiving complaints from members of the public who have been unable to access their local CAB due to that bureau’s resources being largely or even overwhelmingly consumed by dispersed, NASS supported asylum seekers needing assistance in contacting NASS. Such circumstances only serve to foster hostility towards asylum seekers, and to undermine the work of CABx to combat existing racial tensions in their local community.

6.3 In our view, the Government’s decision to establish what is essentially a parallel housing and social security system for a relatively small client group was misguided. And the idea that a division of a central government agency, based in south London, could effectively administer such a national system without local counter services was simply not realistic. We believe that it would have been more effective, in terms of service delivery, to have reverted to delivering welfare support to needy asylum seekers through the mainstream welfare benefit systems.

6.4 We welcome the decision to abolish the asylum vouchers, and hope that the alternative payment mechanism will be fully explained in the White Paper on immigration and asylum, due to be published shortly.

6.5 We also welcome many of the recommendations set out in the Government’s report, published in October 2001, of the internal voucher and dispersal reviews. We share the Government’s view that the implementation of these recommendations should lead to NASS providing "a better service to asylum seekers and other stakeholders". For example, the proposal, already being piloted in Dover, to set a date for the Home Office IND asylum interview and issue the individual with a travel warrant at the time that the individual is accepted into the NASS support system, should reduce the number of travel warrant related problems. The deployment of additional NASS officials to the regions (to liaise with and monitor the services of accommodation providers), better channels of communication with NASS’ social partners and stakeholders, new communication channels between NASS and the Benefits Agency, and improved casework management systems should also make a real difference to the service provided by NASS.

6.6 However, we are far from convinced that the implementation of these measures alone will eradicate administrative delay and process error on the part of NASS, and thus the need for NASS supported asylum seekers to access NASS with a view to resolving such problems. And it is clear that the basic policy of dispersal and the provision of welfare support by NASS is going to continue for several years to come, with only a very small proportion of all needy asylum seekers being accommodated in the proposed asylum reception centres.

6.7 Given that, we believe that the following additional steps must be taken by the Government if NASS is to provide an "efficient, high quality" and responsive service to supported asylum-seekers, in line with the Government’s wider strategy for modernising public services:

· NASS must be expanded, decentralised and regionalised, so as to provide a responsive and accessible service at a local level. In particular, NASS must establish adequate counter or ‘drop-in’ services for supported asylum seekers. Staff providing these counter services must have language skills appropriate to the ‘language clusters’ in that area.

· Performance targets must be set and published for each main aspect of NASS’ administration of the support system, and these targets must be adequately monitored. This will require effective case management and recording mechanisms.

· At local, regional and national levels, NASS must be appropriately managed, and sufficiently resourced, to ensure that all its performance targets are met. This should involve the secondment (or longer term recruitment) of both senior managers and casework staff from the Benefits Agency and local authority social services with direct experience of administering welfare benefit systems.

· The £50 six-monthy supplementary cash grants, which currently must be applied for, should be provided automatically.

· Specific and urgent action should be taken to ensure that NASS F